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WHO IS TO BLAME?
IN ANSWER TO MR. A. J. R. SCHUMAKER.
BY THE EDITOR.
A FEW weeks ago I received a letter from Mr. Albert J. R.Schumaker, expressing his indebtedness to me as his first
teacher in philosophy, and at the same time his disappointment in
having finally discovered that I was not the guide in life he had
expected to find. He had taken me for a good orthodox Christian
in the traditional sense of the word and when he became better
acquainted with my conception of God, the soul and immortality,
he found my religion all hollow, and so he accuses me of having
misguided, perhaps deceived, him. Now I ask myself. Who is to
blame, he or I, or both of us?
After some personal remarks of how he had gradually ac-
-quainted himself with my writings Mr. Schumaker recapitulates his
case thus :.
"In summary, your philosophy was the first which my growing-
mind appropriated. After all I feel that I thus received a pretty
fair introduction to the philosophical disciplines.
"I still read Tlie Moiiist and The Open Court, but with very
different feelings from the first. And so, while I write to thank
you for the splendid introduction to philosophy your works afforded
and for the impetus to study which their vigor, enthusiasm and
manifest love of the subject imparted, it is to say also that I have
learned to disagree with you."
One of the greatest advantages an author, and especially a
philosopher, can have, is the chance of explaining all the most im-
portant misconceptions of his readers. Therefore, as a matter of
mere prudence, I have published all the criticisms of my position
that in my opinion were worth a hearing, and I deem it a great
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privilege to receive them and to have a chance of replying to them.
So far as it lies within my power I shall always be glad to explain
my views more specifically or. if I find that I have made mistakes,
to retract my errors. For these reasons I requested Mr. Schumaker
to let me have a statement of his objections for publication and in
this number I am able to submit his strictures to our readers.
It would be wrong to dispose of Mr. Schumaker's objection
simply by stating that he is mistaken, for it might lead to the opinion
that I am un-Christian or opposed to Christianity. I have no reason
to say that I am not a Christian, only my Christianity is such as to
allow also the recognition of the truth in other religions. I am
perhaps just as much a Buddhist, or a pagan in the way that Goethe
was. For this reason I feel inclined to be more explicit in my
answer.
The luain reason for Mr. Schumaker's disappointment, so far
as it is not due to a mere misunderstanding on his part, may be the
peculiar position which I hold in the present generation of writers,
and it is this: I combine two extremes which are generally assumed
to exclude one another. I am at once both radical and conservative.
I rule out of court all evidence of a non-scientific nature, based upon
belief either in mystic phenomena or upon special revelation. I am
more radical than the agnostic who does not dare to rely on his own
reasoning and is too timid to have an opinion of his own. But I
believe in evolution and in growth. I believe that the history of
mankind is somewhat analogous to the life of an individual and
that there are successive stages in the development of religion.
Just as the age of childhood with its incompleteness and ig-
norance (including the love of fairy-tales), its mistakes, and even
a sprinkling of childhood diseases, is a natural phase in man's life,
so the mythological and dogmatic periods are indispensable in the
history of the mental development of mankind. We need not re-
pudiate our childhood. On the contrary we must utilize it and build
upon it if we want to attain the full stature of manhood. For this
reason we must learn to comprehend the past, but not ignore nor
reject it; we must continue the work done by our ancestors, not dis-
own their aspirations ; we must build higher upon the foundations
laid, not rescind them and begin the work anew.
A grave but quite unwarranted accusation is raised against my
honesty, but nothing can be farther from me than the intention of mis-
leading, deceiving, writing between the lines,* or making evasions.
* To write between the lines is a practice that has gradually become es-
tablished among modern theologians who try to avoid giving offense to those
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I am anxious to let all thinking men understand my position, be-
cause I am confident that I have something to say. I have a message
to the world, and I want that message well understood. I clearly
discern some important truths, and wish to have them generally
known. Whatever I say I mean, and I have never shirked the truth.
I grant that, albeit in a very limited way, T use the old religious
nomenclature for a new world-conception, but I have repeatedly
discussed the advisability of doing so, and I do it with a good con-
science and not without weighty reasons.
Mr. Schumaker speaks of my "claim" of being a Christian.
But certainly I have nowhere made that claim ; on the contrary, I
have insisted that it was for the Christians to say whether or not
I was a Christian,* and in response to that statement made without
any thought of eliciting replies, I received letters from orthodox
Christians who claimed me as one of their own in spirit, though not
in doctrine. I refer my readers to the letters of the Rev. R. J. Camp-
bell of the City Temple, London, the Rev. John Harrington Edwards
of Brooklyn, and Mme. Hyacinthe Loyson (O. C, XIX, 765, 766),
and also Dr. \Mlliam E. Barton, of Oak Park (XX, p. 57).
I am pleased to know that there are Christians in the orthodox
camp who have not excommunicated me, although I freely confess
that I am not a Christian in the current sense of the term. Yet fear
of excommunication is absolutely foreign to me. I would not alter
one line in my writings for the sake of pleasing the orthodox, even
if all Christians would uiiisono condemn me as a heretic, a pagan,
or an infidel, and I would bear the fate without discomfiture, for
there is no longer either any danger or any dishonor connected with
excommunication.
On the other hand I have not changed my tactics because some
unbelievers and freethinkers have reproached me for my indulgence
with the faith of traditional Christianity. f If it may truly be said
of their students and readers who still chng to the old way of thinking. In
my article on "Modern Theology" I have explained the reason why they must
do so and am prepared to defend the method. I do not say that they should
mislead or pronounce untruths, but I would not deem it wrong if they are
guarded in their expressions, and hold back the results of their investigations
whenever they feel that their audience is not sufficiently matured for the
truth. In his letter Mr. Schumaker refers to tlie passage in The Open Court
(November, 1907, p. 684) and assumes that "writing between the lines" was a
method practised by mj^self, but he is mistaken. What I deem excusable in
a theologian or a teacher and educator, I would not allow a philosopher.
* See for instance my article "Pro Domo" in The Open Court, XIX, p.
577 ff., especially page 583, where the statement is very explicit.
t See the editorial article "Destructive or Constructive," (III, 2107), where
Mr. H. B. Green's vigorous objections are quoted; and "Is Dr. Carus a
Theist?" by Amos Waters, Monist, IX, 624.
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that I am a Christian, I am a Christian of the Christianity of the
future which is just developing now at the present time under the
influence that science exercises upon the Christianity of the present.
I may state in this connection that I had the same experience
with Buddhists. They urged me to say that I am a Buddhist, but
I answered that I would not do so, for it is for the Buddhists to say
whether or not I am a Buddhist. I have expounded my philosophical
convictions and my views of Buddhism as I understand it, and if
they agree with me, let them claim me as a Buddhist. It is not im-
possible that the Buddhism of the future will be very much like the
Christianity of the future, and the same may come true of other re-
ligions.
I do not care to discuss here Mr. Schumaker's slurring comments
on my solution of the freedom of will. He seems familiar with
Presbyterian traditions only, for he says that "the scientific theo-
logians are all strict determinists." Apparently he does not know
that Calvin and his followers take an exceptional position on this
special point and differ from the Roman Catholic and Lutheran
views. I will only add that I no more confuse willing with doing
than with mere wishing. Will is a tendency to act according to
one's character ; and I would not deny that even when confined to
a cask stuck around with nails a man might refuse to yield to com-
pulsion and thereby preserve the integrity of his character. Mr.
Schumaker has apparently not grasped the meaning of my expo-
sition.
From his standpoint of Christian belief, Mr. Schumaker im-
agines that I look with contempt upon theology and theologians.
He represents me as having said that they had committed the sin
against the Holy Ghost which, according to my exegetics. is a
hopeless stultification of reason. Some theologians certainly are in
my opinion guilty of this offense. I may even say that the stulti-
fication of reason was in certain periods deemed as the only true
orthodoxy, but Mr. Schumaker is nevertheless grossly mistaken
when he assumes that I condemn all theologians. I know too many
truly great men among them both of the past and of the present to
make so sweeping an assertion, and some theologians, both orthodox
and heterodox, I count among my best and dearest personal friends.
I have repeatedly called attention to the scientific labors done by
the theologians and the admirable work they have accomplished.*
Mr. Schumaker requires that every article of mine should be
* See e. g. "Theology as a Science," Monist, XII, 544, XIII, 24; and
"Heinrich Julius Holtzmann," Open Court, XVI, 257.
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complete ; I ought to state, and restate in every book all the most
important points of my philosophy so as not to mislead the trustful
reader. I will say in reply that so far as that is possible I do it, and
I even fear that I do it more than is advisable, for I neglect to enter
into the discussion of only those arguments which, I may take it for
granted, are quite familiar to my readers.
I claim that the subtlest philosophical conception of to-day is
nothing but the outcome of a long evolution and all its phases in
mythology and dogmatic theology were not aberrations (though
aberrations may have been connected with it) but necessary steps
in the progress towards truth. The facts of our religious experience
remain the same to-day as they have ever been. The interpretation
only is different, and naturally becomes more refined, more scientific,
more exact, more truthful. It discards mythology and pagan con-
ceptions, and replaces allegorical and poetical descriptions by sober
statements of fact.
I insist on the continuity of development and I feel that I my-
self with my own conception of religion am the product of a long
history. I have discarded much that was deemed essential in former
ages. There was a time in my life when I was in a state of rebellious
infidelity having just discovered the untenableness of religious dog-
mas, but I have grown more sober, and while I retain all the rad-
icalism of that period, while I continue to negate the literal con-
ception of traditional symbols to the same extent as I ever did, I
now understand that my own development is the last link in a long
chain, and that after all as I am the son of an orthodox father, the
present liberalism is but the outcome of a dogmatic past. While
still correcting the errors of the past, we are apt to assume the
attitude of bitterness and resentment, perhaps also of ridicule, but
that is only a symptom of the irritated state of our own mind. As
soon as we have passed through the crisis of the transitional state,
as soon as we have to overcome the potent spell of tradition, as soon
as we begin to know ourselves better and our connection with former
modes of thought, we will naturally become just towards the past
and will discuss with impartiality the points in which we differ from
our ancestors and our objections to their doctrines, and we shall no
longer overlook those very important features which are common
to both sides.
Taking this standpoint it is natural that I no longer hesitate to
use certain terms that have become household words in our religious
life, such as "God," "soul" and "immortality." Especially the term
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"God" is a word whose significance it would l)e difficult to rival by
any new word or combination of words which after all would remain
meaning-less to the majority of people.
On former occasions I have justified the method of retaining
old terms by calling attention to the fact that such was the natural
course of our intellectual development not only in religion but also
in common life and in science. When a new conception of things
or phenomena dawns upon us, when new ideas sprout and throw a
better light upon our interi)retation of the world, w^e rarely coin new
words but we use the old ones and fill them with new meaning. The
method of progress is always that of pouring new wine into old
bottles, and we do this in our interpretation of the commonest facts
of our experience as well as in our more subtle scientific nomen-
clature. \\'e still speak of sunrise and sunset, although we know that
sunrise is caused by the rotation of the earth and not by a rising of
the sun. After all the sun rises if the place w'here we are is taken as
the point of reference. At the same time physicists still speak of
electric currents, although we know very well that the ether waves
which to our eye create the phenomenon of light are not currents or
streams like the flowing water of a river. They are waves which
are transmitted through the stationary ether. But it is justifiable
to retain the old words and fill them with new meaning on the simple
ground that it is easier to change the meaning of a word than to
inveiit a new word for every new shade of meaning.
Our mental development would be poorly served if we had to
change our terminolog}' and invent a new language with every new
departure in our intellectual life. The continuity of our comprehen-
sion of the world is a most significant factor, for we build upon the
foundation laid by former generations. Their notions are the first
and tentative statements which continue in our conceptions. Our
ideas are theirs, only further developed by a deeper insight, and we
can not get rid of our past without depriving ourselves of the start
we have gained, which is the pedestal on which we stand.
It would have been wrong on my part if I had used any one of
the traditional w^ords with the purpose to mislead and make my
readers believe that I still retained the old views, but 1 trust that
such is not the case, and that Mr. Schumaker insinuates this simply
because he has misunderstood me in the immature period of his de-
velopment.
However, the most important point of Mr. Schumaker's criti-
cism is not the question whether or not I am a Christian and whether
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or not it may be right to consider me as such, but whether or not
my philosophy is true ; and I regret to say that I would have to
repeat all the main tenets of my position in order to prove my case.
I must leave the judgment of that question to those students who
take the trouble to study my conception of the world, of life, of the
soul, of God, of religion, of art and of ethics.
The basic issue which seems to me the main cause of all mis-
understanding is the question as to the significance of form. Here
lies the key to the whole situation, and I trust that a proper explana-
tion of the significance of form will justify both my radicalism and
my conservatism.
It seems strange that in spite of the bold stand I take in the line
of liberalism, taking fearlessly the ultimate conclusions of free
thought. I do not iconoclastically condemn the traditional forms of
religious aspirations. Far from being an enemy of historical Chris-
tianity, as Mr. Schumaker thinks, I am its best friend and supporter.
However, I am not willing to be limited by the institutions and views
of the past, but propose to build upon them a better, higher, and
truer conception of religion and so to develop a nobler future out
of the best that the present has inherited from the past.
It takes a fairly well trained mind to understand the significance
of the purely formal, but its effects are palpable even to the crudest
intellect in spite of the subtlety of its nature, and even the savage
stands in awe of that miraculous power which sways the fate of the
world and also shapes his own destiny even in minute details. Man
is a creature of sense, he overrates feeling, and the fleeting phe-
nomenon of consciousness is to him the most important reality of
his experience. In agreement with his sensuous nature he likewise
overrates the importance of matter. We must bear in mind that
matter is thai something in the objective world which corresponds
most closely to sensation. Matter is the sense-perceived and sensa-
tion is that subjective phenomenon which is caused through impact
with a material body. There is a further similarity between the two
in that both are in their very nature particular and concrete ; both
are located in time and space and possess a definite form. Every
material object, like every sensation, is somewhere, somewhen and
somehow. How dififerent are the norms of formal relations as they
appear e. g., in geometrical propositions ! They are nowhere, yet
apply generally ; they are universal in their nature ; fhey are not
particular, not concrete, not material, yet they determine the actions
and forms of all that is particular, concrete, and material.
Man being first of all a material body, concrete and particular.
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is by nature a materialist. Whenever he sees effects he represents
them as being due to some substance, to an entity, or a person, and
if he learns to resolve his comprehension into exact scientific state-
ments, proving- them to be the result of form, he would be inclined
to think that they have lost their reality, for to the unsophisticated
man matter alone is real, perhaps also energy, but form to him is
a mere accidental phenomenon which comes and goes and has no
lasting significance. lie witnesses the changeability of form but
he can not perceive with his senses (only with his mind's eye) that
back of all forms there is the eternality of a norm w^hich is the
formative law that dominates the formation of all single instances.
This background of the eternal norm is the most potent reality in
life, and so in the folk-lore state of the development of mankind it
is personified in the shape of superhuman beings who are conceived
as endowed with mental intelligence after the analogy of man. If
now science appears in the field and explains the nature of the norm-
ative factors of existence the personification of the gods disappears,
and the conservative religionists grow indignant at the impiety of the
philosopher who deprives the people of their religion. Under such
conditions Socrates was called an atheist and was compelled to drink
the cup of hemlock. He was deemed dangerous to the religion of
Athens.
Under the monistic tendency with which all thought is possessed
the polytheistic conception has changed into monotheism, the belief
in one comprehensive personality of whom the old gods are mere
attributes. This was an important progress, but it was not yet the
attainment of a scientific conception. The paganism of mythological
religion was not overcome thereby, for the principle of personifica-
tion has been retained. God was not conceived as God, but as a huge
omnipotent monarch, as a benevolent and paternal ruler of the world.
That was the solution of the God-problem satisfactory to minds who
were still pagan in their souls, i. e., who still retained the need of
parables and allegories, and could not yet see the truth except in a
mythological symbol. But to-day we have become more and more
familiar with the nature of the cosmos and comprehend that the laws
of nature are intrinsically necessary norms, and this holds good not
only with reference to the physical laws but also those phenomena
which belong to the mental and moral spheres of our life and also
those far-reaching influences in history which we may classify under
the term of providence. All these profounder interrelations teach
a lesson to the thoughtful, and we may call them by a phrase much
used in traditional theology, "the still small voice of God." From
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a rigidly scientific standpoint we can furnish an explanation of what
is called divine providence, but we expect the reactionary spirit to
rise up in indignation and call the philosopher who proposes these
explanations an atheist. He takes away the personification of that
something which governs and directs and guides the world, of that
something which has molded mankind, and into the image of which
man's soul has been formed, but the reason of this alarm consists
simply in the lack of an appreciation of the significance of all that
is formal. The man untrained in abstract thought looks upon mere
form as a nonentity and so a more scientific conception of the world
naturally presents itself to him as nihilism, atheism, and infidelity.
The alarm found in hyper-reactionary circles is quite excusable
and I can appreciate it because I have passed through the same
development. I understand that it can not be otherwise. It is the
natural attitude during a transitional period. It is the counterpart
of the attitude of the infidel who having found out that the symbols
of our religious traditions are allegorical, and not literal truths,
throws ofif the restraint of moral injunction and declares it to be
a yoke which has been imposed upon human society by pious fraud
and priestcraft. Their attitude too is natural and, since the social
order of humanity is a product of experience, we ought not to
grudge to them the right to have their grievances discussed and in-
vestigated. It will help us to do away with all those restrictions
which have been a hindrance to the development of the human soul,
while it will insist the more rigidly upon all that is essential in our
moral standard.
The former factors that have swayed the world from eternity
will continue to remain its norm forever and aye, and the same power
that shaped human society and brought punishment upon sin in the
days of savage life is as active now as it was in the past, and though
we now understand that it is not an individual being, it is as truly
omnipotent and irrefragable as it was to the barbarian who bent his
knee before an idol in which his conception of the deity was sym-
bolized.
We can do away with symbols in the measure that we under-
stand the truth, but those who do not yet possess the truth had better
retain the surrogate of truth in the shape of symbols. The religious
symbols of the past ages have not been errors but they were tentative
formations of the truth. They were frequently adulterated by errors
leading to superstitions, but in the sieve of competition which in the
struggle for existence selects the best for survival, the wrong forms
have been discarded and mankind has developed a nobler and truer
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conception of that divine cminiprcsenco in wliich \vc live and move
and have our being.
Mr. Schnmaker finds special difficulty in my conception of im-
mortality, and here I can only say that I do not expect Christians
of the old type to take to it kindly until they have really acquired a
thorough scientific maturity. It is the last prejudice that has to be
overcome, but the time is sure to come when even this view will be
generally accepted.
All religions insist on an immortality of some kind in one form
or another and rightly so, for if a man regulates his life with the
idea in his mind that death is a finality, and that the end of his in-
dividual career blots him out entirely, he will naturally act in a
selfish and perhaps even truly thoughtless way ; but even if people
are not capable of understanding the nature of the soul, its origin,
its destiny, and its interrelation with the society in the past and in the
future, they will notice that the results of their actions are carried
far beyond the range of their individual lives. The individual
actually consists of his relations to his fellow men, and in main
outlines other men are molded after the same pattern, a truth which
in religious language is stated in the doctrine of the brotherhood of
man and the fatherhood of God. Here again the formal concatena-
tion of events is such as to force upon us the idea of a continued life.
I will not .enter upon the subject itself, because I would have to
repeat myself and incorporate long quotations from my booklet
JVheiice and Jlliifhcr. I will here only insist on the fact that the
after-life of man's career is so important that any ethical system
which leaves out a consideration of that vista would miss the main
point and would fail to explain the ethical problem. I grant that
the traditional terminology may be improved and that we might
e. g., make a difference between such terms as "life after death" and
"immortality," but both expressions have good sense and a true
meaning even from the standpoint of a most radical conception of
the nature of the soul. Every soul that has accomplished something
on earth, even the babe that has died at birth, leaves some definite
influence upon the living which will affect the future fate of man-
kind in its onward march ; and on the other hand as all types of
existence have their prototype in the realm of eternal norms, so too
human souls are mere incarnations of eternal ideas which partake
of the same di\inity as the other formative factors of the world at
large.
Ever\- idea that impresses the mind of man as of special sig-
nificance has become a center of myth-formation. Legends cluster
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about great persons and about the discovery of important theories.
Think of the tea-kettle of James Watt, of the falling apple that
caused Newton to ponder over the law of gravitation, and many
other instances. There are actually people who believe that if Mrs.
Watt had not made tea on that momentous evening, we would have
no steam engines to-day; that if the apple had not fallen just at the
moment when young Newton was standing under the branches of
the apple-tree we would know nothing of the law of gravitation.
He who explains myths to be poetic figments need not as yet deny
the historic facts for the adornment of which they have been in-
vented. He who denies that Zeus is an actual personality does not
deny that there is such a dispensation in the destiny of the world as
if it were governed by a kind ruler such as Zeus was described to be
by the Greek poets.
All things are what they are through form. The table is a
table, because of the shape and the purpose which it serves. A
watch, a steam engine, a dynamo, a motor, are what they are be-
cause they have been constructed to be what they are, and man
too with all his thoughts and aspirations is a product of form. Form
is not an unessential accident but the most essential feature of all
concrete existence. And in the history of life there is a transforma-
tion and preservation of the forms of life, and this preservation of
form by transmission from generation to generation makes evolu-
tion possible. All lives are interconnected, the life of bygone ages
pulsates in the life of to-day and we ourselves .build mansions for
our souls in the generations to come.
The form of man's sentiments, thoughts, and strivings is called
his character, and his character constitutes his personality. The very
personal features of a man are preserved in the development of the
race ; they are incorporated in the lives of posterity, while his bodily
existence, his individuality, passes away.*
This view of life and this conception of form, especially of the
preservation of life-forms, of thought-forms, of aspirations (or will-
forms) is no mere fancy, but it is an important fact which we must
bear in mind if we wish to understand the meaning of existence.
You may answer (and the same answer has been made by sev-
eral people) "What do I care for my personality if I can not have
my individuality along with it, including the continuity of conscious-
* Note the difference I make between personality and individuality. Man's
personality is his character. Man's individuality is that which makes him a
concrete, definite and bodily being, an individual. There is no inconsistency
in my statement of the transienc}^ and finiteness of the individual, while I
claim that there is a preservation of personality.
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ness and a remembrance of my past in its very details?" I say, "It
may be that you care more for your individuality than for your per-
sonality, but God (or whatever you may call the dispensation of the
worfd and of the development of mankind) cares only for your per-
sonahty and utilizes your individuality only for the good you accom-
plish. What you accomplish is your spiritual self, your soul, the
quintessence of your being-. Your body together with the function
of feeling, of consciousness, is but a means to an end. Your soul
is like the contents of a book, your individual existence (your body)
is like the paper on which the book, i. e., the words and sentences
possessed of a definite meaning, are written. The author who writes
a book cares for the ideas which he presents, and the several indi-
vidual copies are the means for rendering his thoughts intelligible.
Every copy possesses a value, and some copies may possess more
value than others on account of their qualities in paper, print or
artistic ornamentation, but every copy is perishable while the book
endures.
The contents of a book, its soul or spirit, is not a nonentity, but
it is its most important feature. It is a mere relational quality, and
there is no substance of which it has been made ; yet it bears an
analogous significance to that of a man's soul. The words of a
book express meaning, they possess a tendency, a will of a definite
direction, a purpose.
I will not try here to persuade Mr. Schumaker that he should
accept my view of immortality ; he would better retain his own until
he finds it wanting and feels the need of a broader and (what is
more important) a truer view. I will only point out that I am not
inconsistent and know very well what I said when I insisted that
the individual, the particular, the bodily, will pass away, while the
personality, that which constitutes a comprehension of the universal,
the spiritual, the very soul of man, perseveres.
May he who is not yet able to see face to face, see as through a
glass darkly ; his vision may be dim, but dim vision is better than
blindness.
